Answer: China could inflict severe damage on Australia by targeting its northern air bases, satellite communications, and critical ports, using a mix of missile strikes, cyber attacks and anti‑access/area‑denial (A2/AD) forces.
At 04:12 a.m. local time on 12 June, a low‑flying Chinese J‑20 fighter buzzed over Darwin’s RAAF Base Tindal, a routine patrol that analysts say is a rehearsal for a potential first‑strike scenario.
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) estimates that China fields enough DF‑26 intermediate‑range ballistic missiles to blanket the entire Australian east coast within minutes. Each missile can carry a 500‑kilogram conventional warhead, enough to cripple a port like Newcastle, Australia’s coal‑export hub.
What does the weapon mix look like?
China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has deployed around 20 DF‑26 launchers to the tropical islands of Hainan and the South China Sea. From there, the missiles have a range of 3,000–5,000 km, reaching Brisbane, Sydney and even Melbourne.
On the cyber front, Beijing’s Unit 61398, long identified by U.S. cyber‑espionage reports, has run simulated intrusions against Australia’s Defence Materiel Organisation. The simulations showed the ability to shut down the Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for up to 72 hours.
Naval assets add another layer. The Liaoning‑class carrier group can operate within 1,200 km of Perth, deploying submarine‑launched Yu‑6 torpedoes capable of sinking commercial tankers that supply Australia’s offshore gas rigs.
Why does this matter?
Australia relies on three major export commodities—iron ore, coal and liquefied natural gas—that together account for over 30 % of its GDP. A coordinated strike on Port Kembla, the Port Phillip Bay complex, or the Perth‑based Swan Port could shave billions off the national economy in a single week.
For everyday Australians, the ripple effect translates to higher electricity bills, fewer jobs in mining towns and a weakened national security posture that could force the government to tighten immigration and defence spending.
What could the government do?
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has pledged AU$30 billion to harden northern airfields, but experts argue that without a sovereign satellite communications network, Australia remains vulnerable to a Chinese ‘cyber‑kill‑chain’ that could blind air‑defence radars within seconds.
Investments in low‑earth‑orbit (LEO) constellations, similar to those pursued in the technology and AI sector, could provide a resilient backup to existing satellite links.
Regional allies matter too. The recent AUKUS agreement brings US‑built nuclear‑powered submarines to Australian waters, but those assets will not be operational until the mid‑2020s, leaving a dangerous gap.
What happens next?
Watch for two key indicators: (1) increased PLA reconnaissance flights over the Timor Sea, and (2) a surge in ransomware attacks on Australian defence contractors. Both signal a sharpening of Beijing’s hybrid‑war toolkit.
The next few months will test whether Canberra can “fight on the coast” or be forced into a costly, reactive scramble. Follow our coverage as the strategic calculus evolves.